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Human rights and international 
mutual legal assistance: Resolving the 
tension 
Robert J. Currie1 
If indeed, as has been said, "it is fashionable nowadays to discuss the problems that arise 
from the application of general human rights to extradition", 1 then it is also true that 
human rights concerns are increasingly being raised with regard to other forms of 
international criminal co-operation as well. As compliance with international human rights 
norms has become the subject of greater scrutiny by both States and international 
adjudicative bodies, concerns have been raised regarding their application to the various 
processes by which States aid each other in combating transnational crime. Prosecuting 
authorities are presented with problems of how the standards for the protection of the 
individual to which their national system subscribes can be given effect in a situation 
where the norms, views and obligations of another sovereign State are directly engaged.2 A 
disparity in human rights protection between two jurisdictions may leave States in the 
difficult position of being unable or unwilling to co-operate in an international criminal 
investigation, and possibly in violation of an obligation to do so. 
This troubled logarithm has been the focus of a great deal of discussion and debate on the 
extradition front. However, despite the importance of extradition as a tool for securing the 
assistance of foreign States in the prosecution of criminal offenders, it is acknowledged that 
the discussion must of necessity be taken to other forms of co-operation, particularly the 
provision of mutual legal assistance (MLA). WhileMLA "does not involve such a direct and 
far-reaching intrusion into the personal liberty of the individual" as extradition,3 the 
exchange of evidence and access to foreign courts that is embodied in the various MLA 
treaty regimes raises similar issues, and has important human rights implications. As the 
International Law Association recently stated, "[m]utual [legal] assistance treaties 
[hereafter MLATs] have not received the attention they deserve despite the key role they 
play in international co-operation in the suppression of crime".4 
This article explores the interaction of human rights and MLA, in an effort to identify 
current trends and offer suggestions for future practice. Focus will be placed in particular 
upon the tension existing between the internationalization of human rights and the need 
for effective and efficient techniques with which to combat transnational crime. The first 
section will explore the factors and dilemmas faced by the requested State (i.e., the State 
receiving a request for criminal assistance) in deciding whether to co-operate in the 
provision of MLA. In concluding the first section, possible resolutions for predicaments 
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faced by the requested State will be evaluated. Particular attention will be paid to proposals 
by the Committee on Extradition and Human Rights of the International Law Association 
(ILA), which comprise scholarly examination of a recent vintage.5 
The provision ofMLA, however, may be distinguished from extradition in that the 
requesting State (i.e., the State making the request for cooperative assistance) must also 
decide whether there is a conflict with its human rights obligations in accepting and using 
evidence from a foreign jurisdiction. The second section will canvass this and related 
issues, and offer possible solutions in conclusion. Again, particular emphasis will be placed 
on the submissions of the ILA on these matters. 
The general theme throughout will be similar to that which has pervaded the extradition 
literature: examining international criminal cooperation from a human rights stable 
presents the challenge of balancing the protection of the individual with the larger, 
international societal interest in combating crime.6 It will be emphasized that, as the need 
to combat international crime grows and what might be called an "international criminal 
procedure" comes into being, this process will require an embedded substantive protection 
for human rights. However, both the need for flexibility and comparative differences in 
domestic criminal law regimes will entail a system of protection framed differently than 
analogous domestic norms. 
Considering that aspects of MLA practice stem from extradition law, as well as the fact that 
human rights implications in that area have been explored by both commentators and 
courts, extradition will be drawn upon by way of analogy as far as is useful and relevant. 
Also, the United Nations Model Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance 19907 will be utilized as 
a functional model in evaluating various MLA provisions, as will several other multilateral 
and bilateral instruments and arrangements.8 
A. DEFINING MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
Mutual legal assistance has been recognized as one of the most innovative techniques for 
inter-jurisdictional law enforcement to emerge this century, and "the fastest growing 
business in the criminal justice field".9 Its growth in popularity has largely been a response 
to the increasing amount and sophistication of transnational crime,10 as the need was 
perceived by criminal justice authorities to co-operate in the transmission of evidence 
between jurisdictions.11 This was conceived both as a reaction to the traditional 
jurisdictional difficulties associated with prosecuting transnational crime, and as a 
proactive and realistic means of attacking crime in an age of instantaneous communication 
and open borders. 
Traditionally carried out through the diplomatic system of letters rogatory,12 MLA is now 
largely a creature of treaty and the subject of arrangements on both the bilateral and 
multilateral levels.13 For present purposes, it is suitable to adopt Gilmore's definition of 
MLA in criminal matters: "the process whereby one State provides assistance to another in 
the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences".14 This definition includes what 
Gilmore describes as "such unglamourous but highly practical matters" as the provision of 
evidence, documentary or viva voce, for use abroad; the search and seizure of evidence for 
use in foreign proceedings; the transfer of witnesses for interview; and the serving of 
documents originating in another jurisdiction.15 
B. THE REQUESTED STATE: WHITHER INCOMPATIBLE OBLIGATIONS? 
One of the most vexing problems with regard to the interaction of international criminal 
assistance and human rights standards has been the question of how to reconcile potential, 
and occasionally realized, conflicts of international obligations, as well as conflict on a more 
general policy level. It is entirely possible that a State could have an obligation to provide 
mutual legal assistance to a treaty partner, yet be fully cognizant that the evidence will be 
used in a criminal prosecution wherein human rights standards to which the State is bound 
will not be upheld. This State has a two-pronged dilemma: first, is the provision of 
assistance on such facts a violation of its human rights commitments? If so, then how is the 
State to resolve the fact that it must breach either its human rights obligation or its 
cooperation obligation to the treaty partner? What is a State's duty in the face of conflicting 
international obligations, and which obligation prevails? The answers remain far from 
clear. 
I. Conflicting Obligations: Extradition and the Soering Principle 
The existence of this type of conflict has been played out in the extradition context, and the 
first question answered in the affirmative. A traditional analysis might determine that, 
where the requested State was not involved in the actual violation of the right involved, 
then responsibility could not be incurred through extradition.16 The cases of Soering,17 
Ng18 and Short,19 however, each found international human rights tribunals or domestic 
courts deciding that a State that extradited persons to a State where certain fundamental 
rights were threatened would violate its conventional human rights obligations. The 
Soering case in particular has been hailed by many as heralding a fundamental change in 
the interaction of international criminal co-operation and human rights, with only slight 
exaggeration accorded to the assigning of the "pre-Soering and post-Soering" era labels.20 
In a general sense, this development vindicates the idea that the individual, rather than 
being simply the object of international law,21 has a certain amount of international legal 
personality and the capacity to enjoy rights autonomously as a subject of international 
law.22 Moreover, these cases have adduced a link between human rights and international 
criminal co-operation that did not exist previously. They represent a clear expression of 
international and domestic judicial opinion that States engage their human rights 
obligations when they reach a certain degree of involvement in criminal proceedings 
against an individual, though the threshold of this engagement is far from being 
determined.23 As such, under certain human rights regimes States may become 
responsible for violations through simply partaking of the process, and can be subject to 
supra-national scrutiny based on a system of individual petition in so doing.24 
However, even before attempting to extend what might reasonably be referred to as the 
"Soering principle" to MLA, it should be questioned whether the jubilation surrounding this 
development has been carried slightly too far. Recently, two distinguished commentators 
have explained the effect of the Soering principle in the following manner: 
. . . when an international court or other institution finds a State to be in breach of its 
obligations under a human rights treaty for having extradited a fugitive, primacy is in effect 
accorded to a human rights norm over the extradition treaty.25 
However, these "international courts or other institutions" have as their mandates the 
determination of State compliance with their founding instruments. To determine that 
extraditing a fugitive will breach an obligation under those instruments does not vitiate the 
fact that not extraditing said fugitive will entail a breach of the extradition treaty.26 In 
short, the State is left bound by a set of conflicting international obligations, a situation on 
which international human rights adjudicative bodies are silent. 
II. MLA and the Soering principle 
This tension between obligations raises a more complex dilemma in the MLA context, 
ironically because there is a forceful argument to be made that from a technical point of 
view a similar problem of conflicting obligations does not exist. To be sure, as human rights 
norms take on more force within the international community, it is inevitable that States 
will be called upon to examine their MLA practice from a human rights standpoint,27 since 
from a conceptual point of view the same potential for conflict exists here as with 
extradition. It takes no great prescience to predict that at some point in the future there 
could be a Soering-type case where an adjudicative body will be asked to pronounce on 
whether the provision of MLA for an investigation in some State will violate the requested 
State's human rights obligations. 
The question posed to such an adjudicative body could be the following: will a State engage 
its human rights obligations by providing another State with evidence/assistance for use in 
a criminal investigation or prosecution? Can the Soering principle be extended to MLA 
practice? This is a more complex question even than it appears, as it raises both a very 
technical question of jurisdiction and a more general issue of determining the scope of 
international human rights. Requests for assistance under an MLA arrangement do not 
necessarily presuppose that the subject of the investigation28 is within the jurisdiction of 
the requesting State, but it is a matter of course that the requesting State will carry out any 
prosecution as an exercise of its criminal jurisdiction. Since this is the case, does the 
requested State owe a human rights obligation to a person who is not physically within its 
jurisdiction? This question will be most important in a Soering-type situation where the 
requested State is party to such an instrument but the requesting State is not.29 
Soering found that, in the context of extradition, providing criminal assistance to a State 
which was not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights could engage 
international responsibility. In so doing, as commentators have noted, Soering gives the 
appearance of extraterritorial application of the Convention insofar as it applied 
Convention standards to acts to be carried out in a non-Convention State.30 The Court in 
fact made an effort to avoid such an extraterritorial application, specifically stating that 
"the Convention does not . . . purport to be a means of requiring the Contracting States to 
impose Convention standards on other States".31 Despite the fact that Soering would have 
suffered denial of his rights in the United States, the Court found that the United Kingdom 
owed him the protection of Convention rights as he himself was "within their jurisdiction", 
and thus within the ambit of article 1.32 As such, the Court recognized "an inherent 
obligation" of Convention States not to extradite where the fugitive "would be faced in the 
receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment proscribed by [article 3]".33 Responsibility for breach of the treaty would 
result from the State having "taken action which has as a direct consequence the exposure 
of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment".34 
In the MLA context, however, the accused will most often not be within the jurisdiction of 
the requested State, and will probably be in the jurisdiction of the requesting State at the 
time of a rights violation that appertains to him/her. Does the requested State owe a duty 
of protection to an accused who is physically outside its jurisdiction? The general approach 
to jurisdiction under article 1 of the European Convention has been that "a contracting 
party cannot be held responsible for acts committed by . . . other States in another 
country".35 It may thus be argued that, if the requested State owes no obligation towards 
individuals outside its jurisdiction, then the human rights instrument is not engaged with 
the sending of MLA, and the potential for conflict between that instrument and the MLA 
treaty remains unrealized. The MLA treaty is thus the only instrument that governs 
relations between the parties. 
Other cases before the European Court of Human Rights, however, have provided a 
somewhat expanded notion of jurisdiction. In Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain,36 
the petitioners had been convicted of criminal offences in Andorra (which was not a State 
party at that time) and imprisoned through a prisoner transfer arrangement in France. 
They complained of a breach of the right to a fair trial. While finding no violation, the Court 
did conclude that France's obligation to safeguard the right was engaged through its role in 
the criminal process, and thus responsibility was possible in a retroactive, extraterritorial 
fashion. The Court also stated that "the term 'jurisdiction' is not limited to the national 
territory of the High Contracting Parties; their responsibility can be involved because of 
acts of their authorities producing effects outside their own territory".37 It is arguable that 
the provision of MLA by the requested State is an act of authority producing effects 
extraterritorially. The authorities are certainly exercising jurisdiction over the essential 
legal interests of the person regardless of their physical location, particularly in cases of 
search and seizure.38 
It is submitted, moreover, that human rights issues cannot be disposed of on a purely 
technical level. It seems somewhat facile to declare that protection under a human rights 
instrument extends only to a corporeal human being. Even where a person is physically on 
the territory of the State party, it is the legal interests of this person that are being 
protected, rather than just physical well-being.39 The ambit of international human rights 
law is the protection of the legal interests of all persons, by all States. Assigning 
responsibility for this protection on the basis of physical location, while perhaps explicable 
from a functional point of view, seems unduly arbitrary. This is not to advocate the 
extension of every substantive or procedural human rights obligation to every State with 
regard to every individual, but rather to note that MLA relates to special circumstances. 
The requested State is called upon to act in a compulsory manner that directly affects the 
individual's legal interests, and to assist one of the most invasive forms of interaction 
between State and individual. Accordingly, the requested State is directly engaging the legal 
interest of the individual, and should act in accordance with its own adopted policies on 
human rights protection. 
This proposal represents no manifest injury to the interests of the requested State. If States 
internationalize the processes of crime control, then surely individual protections must be 
similarly internationalized, at least to the extent that the requested State has control over 
the process. Such an admittedly novel extension of jurisdiction will not bind the requesting 
State to the human rights instrument, but is meant to provide the requested State with a 
solid legal basis on which to refuse co-operation in a situation where the individual faces 
human rights violations. To provide evidence for use in a foreign criminal procedure that 
amounts to a "flagrant denial" of fair trial rights,40 simply on the basis that "our human 
rights obligations don't cover the accused", may render the requested State complicit in 
conduct which it has agreed to prohibit, necessarily leaving a bad taste from a legal and 
moral standpoint. 
This basis for refusal is not unknown to MLA practice, but simply unarticulated at the level 
of international obligation. As explored below, standard MLA instruments contain 
enumerated bases for refusal of cooperation specifically geared towards protecting the 
individual. Moreover, the power to provide MLA even under a treaty arrangement is 
maintained in many States as an inherently discretionary decision on the part of the central 
authorities. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Home Office will generally refuse a 
request where it appears that the accused will be subject to human rights violations; this 
decision is justified on the grounds of "public policy", but it is acknowledged that so 
refusing may constitute a breach of the applicable MLAT.41 Both of these aspects suggest a 
duty on the part of the requested State to respect its own human rights obligations in its 
MLA practice, even where the potential or actual violation is extraterritorial. 
Jurisdictional questions aside, however, a State's customary human rights obligations may 
also be engaged through its MLA activities. An inquiry into this issue will best proceed 
through an examination of the specific rights involved. 
III. Which Human Rights? 
The foregoing has suggested a duty of States that are party to an international human 
rights treaty to apply these protective provisions to their MLA practice. It would be hardly 
accurate to suggest an unqualified duty, however, involving every provision of all such 
treaties. Crime suppression is also an important goal, and will necessarily involve a strict 
delimiting of the relationship between the practice of criminal co-operation and the rights 
involved. Accordingly, the question may not be, as Gane has phrased it, "are mutual 
assistance obligations subject to implied human rights restrictions?"42 but rather "which 
rights will restrict co-operation, and to what extent?" 
Conceptually, all human rights norms are potentially applicable to international criminal 
co-operation. However, the development of human rights law has taken into account the 
pressing need for crime control as a necessary component of promoting individual 
freedom. Thus, while certain rights are non-derogable, others must give way to such 
reasonable limitations as are necessary and justified in a free and democratic society.43 
Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights lays out a prohibition 
of arbitrary arrest or detention, and several other rights are similarly limited.44 
The Soering judgement acknowledges that the inter-State balance between law 
enforcement and human rights is a different one than at the national level. The Court stated 
that not all protections in the European Convention on Human Rights were necessarily 
relevant to the extradition process, though it declined to enumerate those which were.45 
Dugard and Van den Wyngaert, based on a survey of State practice and international 
instruments, have observed that it seems "impossible to argue seriously that there is a 
general exception to extradition whenever any human right is seriously threatened, which 
would be opposable by any requested State to any requesting State on the basis of 
obligations assumed under regional and universal international human rights treaties".46 
Given the lower level of intrusiveness involved, the same must be true of MLA. Soering 
involved a request for extradition of an accused to face a possible death sentence, thus 
engaging fundamental issues of individual liberty and dignity. MLA, on the other hand, 
involves providing documents, witness statements and the like, which are more remote to 
the actual deprivation of liberty. Yet, central authorities in many countries would hopefully 
stand aghast at the notion of providing evidence which helped to secure the conviction, and 
subsequent execution, of a person for the crime of adultery under a religious state regime. 
This is an essential quandary in both theory and practice. 
The Commonwealth, which has recently devoted itself to the issue of balancing human 
rights with crime control,47 has noted the following rights as customary and non-
derogable: the right to life;48 the prohibition of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment and punishment;49 the prohibition of slavery; and freedom from 
retroactive criminal laws.50 Notably, none of these rights appear as bases for refusal in the 
United Nations Model Treaty, though such "lesser rights" as nondiscrimination and double 
jeopardy do.51 However, there is widespread international agreement on the non-
derogability of these rights, as well as a strong argument for their being customary 
international law on the level of jus cogens.52 Bearing in mind that the jurisdictional 
argument raised above renders this controversial, the following is submitted: providing 
MLA to a State where an accused is likely to face violation of these rights could violate 
States' human rights obligations under customary law, and possibly under treaty law. Such 
a proposition accords with the general spirit behind Soering, where the Court found that 
liability would be incurred if the United Kingdom took action that consequently exposed 
the petitioner to ill-treatment.53 
This argument is fairly convincing with regard to these jus cogens principles. Admittedly, it 
is "predicated on the possible occurrence of acts that will take place, if at all, in the future, 
outside the jurisdiction of the State party, and by another State over which the [requested] 
State has little or no control".54 However, States have a basic duty to give effect to their 
obligations at international law, including human rights obligations.55 This duty is owed, 
not to the particular individual concerned, but to the entire international community, both 
as a matter of the authority of customary law and the status of at least these human rights 
as obligations erga omnes.56 For a State to eschew the torture of accused persons during 
the criminal process, and yet facilitate such process in another State, reeks of hypocrisy, 
and more importantly frustrates the ambit of the prohibition. Dicta from the Ng case 
indicate that extraditing to a State which practices torture will be a violation of 
obligations,57 and the same logically follows for the purposes of MLA. The illegitimacy of 
such proscribed practices must tip the balance away from the interests of crime control, 
particularly in that they are more likely to spawn further social disorder and defeat ipso 
facto the notion of effective law enforcement. 
Two problems arise. First, the accused will usually have no means through which to apply 
for a decision to refuse assistance by the requested State, as this is an area at the discretion 
of the government with no judicial scrutiny.58 Second, the situation may be subject to 
threshold problems, particularly in terms of differences regarding what constitutes torture 
or degrading/inhuman treatment.59 The conditions under which MLA is provided may 
vary with the State from which evidence is requested, highlighting the difficulty in 
determining any international standard. States with limited resources may also have 
difficulty monitoring conditions in other States so as to determine the danger of rights 
violations, or may turn a political "blind eye" to such danger. All of this militates in favour 
of establishing an international standard, and at least clarifying obligations between treaty 
partners. 
With regard to other rights, the picture becomes increasingly cloudy. The right against 
discrimination is well known to MLA arrangements, and is also a widely-held human 
right.60 However, courts have been reluctant to apply it, due to the difficulties in 
establishing that discrimination is taking place (except in familiar cases, such as South 
Africa).61 Cases of individual discrimination, furthermore, would be almost impossible for 
MLA central authorities to determine with the small amount of information generally 
accompanying an MLA request. Basing a refusal on discrimination, therefore, is inherently 
difficult, as the requested State "does not have an [sic] view of the whole trial".62 
The right to a fair trial is similarly well-established, appearing in many major human rights 
instruments.63 Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights sets 
out the fullest panoply of "due process" rights for the accused, and Gane has suggested that 
all of these are relevant to international co-operation.64 The European Court of Human 
Rights has shown itself willing to consider this issue,65 and has suggested that extradition 
will be denied where the accused faces "a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting 
country".66 In the MLA context, however, there are several other factors. The United 
Nations Model Treaty contains no mention of fair trial rights, which by contrast appear in 
article 3(f) of the Model Treaty on Extradition. This is at least an indication that less 
importance is attached to these rights by the international community in this context. 
Similar to most extradition cases it also suffers from a temporal problem, in that the 
accused has not yet faced trial, disclosing the difficulty of predicting a future event. Finally, 
fundamental differences in the interpretation of "fair trial rights" remain between States 
with common law and civil law traditions.67 Requiring the requested State's process 
standards to be met in the requesting State before providing MLA could hold up co-
operation altogether.68 
In the final analysis, a violation of human rights obligations may be incurred, in certain 
situations, by sending evidence pursuant to an MLA request to a requesting State known to 
endanger such rights. This is a complex matter, made all the more so by the fact that the 
task of addressing it in the first instance falls not to courts, which are fairly well-equipped 
for such matters, but to governments. Also, even if this sort of rights violation is alleged, by 
whom will the requested State be called to task? Unlike extradition, where an accused may 
have some avenues of appeal as part of the process, there is usually no one present in the 
requested State to raise these issues. Moreover, how is a central authority to track the 
violations which may occur within the criminal jurisdictions of treaty partners? Such a task 
may be beyond the resources of the typically already overworked Ministry of Justice 
officials who make and fulfill such requests. The relevance of human rights concerns being 
applied at all in this context has been questioned by one practitioner, who writes: 
Where [MLA] is concerned the requested country is providing information or assistance to 
the criminal justice process of another country. It has so much less influence over what 
finally happens to the person who is the subject of the request.69 
Nonetheless, logic and the Soering principle suggest that to deny that a co-operating State 
is complicit, and thereby responsible, in a human rights violation resulting from the 
conduct of a criminal prosecution is to deny legal effect to the rights themselves. Yet the 
tension surrounding the need for efficient and unobstructed criminal co-operation makes 
the drawing of lines based on human rights considerations rather complex. Imposing strict 
legal standards on this practice could defeat the very flexibility that MLA is designed to 
facilitate. Torture and slavery will be fairly easily determinable, but other rights less so. 
The European Court's dictum that co-operation might be denied where the accused "has 
suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial"70 of some rights might inform the 
discretionary decision of the requested State. Without a legal basis for making such a 
refusal, however, the requested State will incur responsibility for violating its MLA treaty 
with the requesting State. 
IV. Addressing the Conflict: Traditional "Treaty-based" Responses 
As noted above, there has been implicit recognition by States that the requested State owes 
a certain protective duty to the individual when engaged in criminal co-operation, and that 
a means was required to assuage potential conflict. This has manifested itself in the fact 
that MLA practice embodies a number of protective principles, generally taking the form of 
treaty provisions allowing the signatory States to decline a request without violating the 
central obligation to co-operate.71 
Whether these provisions protect the individual by specific design is a matter of debate, 
due to their roots being found in the traditional law of extradition, which largely predates 
the development of international human rights.72 Recent commentary has suggested that 
such provisions are an uncomfortable fit with the modern, rights-oriented idiom due to 
their being dedicated to "political and inter-State considerations which may differ from 
State to State".73 Another commentator has written, however, that while the link between 
these protective provisions and human rights is "by no means self-evident and . . . often 
indirect", they nonetheless promote protection of the individual in a manner that some 
times exceeds the scope of human rights treaties.74 Moreover, grounds of refusal have 
developed in the post-war era that are more specifically tailored to human rights concerns, 
such as the discrimination clause,75 and these are clear evidence of the growing 
significance of international human rights norms for State practice in international criminal 
co-operation. 
Within the extradition context, these grounds for refusal are predominantly expressed in a 
mandatory fashion. In MLA practice, by contrast, States "tend to adopt a discretionary 
formula",76 making refusal on these grounds optional. This suggests, as Gane has written, 
that "the protection of the rights of the individual is of greater importance in the context of 
extradition than in the context of other forms of cooperation in criminal matters".77 
Practically, this functions as a corollary to the reduced concern with individual liberty in 
MLA and allows States flexibility in their co-operation efforts. 
Traditional extradition-based protective principles appearing inMLATs differ in their 
human rights applications. The ground of double criminality78 is not widely employed in 
bilateral treaties,79 but it does allow States to refuse co-operation for conduct which they 
have not criminalized due to human rights concerns.80 The double jeopardy provision 
(based on the principle ne bis in idem81) is found in the United Nations Model Treaty,82 
the Inter-American Convention,83 and the Commonwealth Scheme.84 This provision 
upholds the similar principle expressed in article 14(7) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and is a fairly welldefined protection for that specific right. The 
political offence exception is widely employed in treaties, but has lately been suffering 
some criticism as being increasingly irrelevant to the modern context of international 
criminal co-operation.85 
One unique feature of MLATs which has the potential to allow States an outlet for avoiding 
implication in human rights violations is the ordre public clause.86 This type of provision 
allows States to refuse assistance based on loosely-defined essential interests, including 
sovereignty, security and public order. The provision has its origins in States' reluctance to 
bind themselves to provide certain kinds of evidence, some of which might betray national 
security or industrial secrets. However, it has been acknowledged that the ambit of this 
exception could be sufficiently wide to cover human rights matters: 
Mutual assistance might therefore legitimately be refused where the requested State has 
reason to believe that the assistance it provides may be used to violate the accused's 
human rights on the grounds that this would prejudice that State's essential interests by 
placing it in violation of its treaty obligations or its obligations under general international 
law.87 
As Swart points out, however, ordre public "is a rather vague criterion, compelling the 
requested State to examine the question in each single case".88 Moreover, practitioners 
have expressed scepticism regarding ordre public, noting that its use may impede the 
effective provision of MLA and hinder reciprocity89 - without specifically protecting 
human rights. 
In the extradition context, the States of the European Union have moved to further restrict 
even the operation of these protections in favour of more efficient co-operation.90 
However, this development is due not to decreasing interest in human rights protection 
among these States, but rather the converse: protection of the individual can be relaxed 
among these States which are all party to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
share a common history and vision, with a commensurate level of trust that, for example, 
fair trial rights will be ensured.91 Such an arrangement is ideally suited to co-operation 
among States subject to a supra-national human rights adjudicative body whose rulings can 
have direct effect domestically. Even States parties to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, however, are not subject to the same level of supervision. Accordingly, 
the assumption of human rights goodwill cannot be a widely-used instrument of policy in 
this way. 
While these protective provisions are directed towards protecting the individual during 
transnational criminal process, this motivation does not translate to a specific targeting of 
the relevant human rights norms. It is not merely organizational semantics to wish for a 
specific engaging of human rights protections in this manner, for agreement on such would 
allow States to protect their human rights interests, make co-operation more predictable 
and thereby more efficient, and shield them from responsibility for refusal to co-operate. 
Current MLA practice does not provide for the assessment by States of whether and to 
what extent their co-operation engages their human rights obligations, which could lead to 
the situation of conflicting obligations raised above. 
V. Addressing the Conflict: The Substantive Law of Treaties 
If a conflict between a State's human rights treaty obligation and its MLA obligation can be 
made out, then it is essential to determine whether a priority can be found. It has been 
suggested in prestigious quarters that, crudely put, human rights obligations simply trump 
conflicting treaties on the basis of their status as a "higher" form of international law.92 Yet 
this formulation of priority for human rights appears to be aspirational, and does not solve 
the problem of the requested State's responsibility under the criminal co-operation treaty. 
The substantive law of treaties is helpful in illuminating the problem, if not in resolving it. 
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,93 on "Application of successive 
treaties relating to the same subject-matter",94 governs conflicting treating obligations. 
Paragraph (3) provides that, where two States are party to two treaties, "the earlier treaty 
applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty". 
Where one State is party to both treaties, and the other only to one, paragraph (4)(b) 
declares that "the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and 
obligations".95 Article 31(3)(c) establishes a general rule that treaties must be interpreted 
in light of "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties". 
It has been suggested that, presupposing an extradition treaty, where both requesting and 
requested State are also parties to a human rights instrument, that instrument will have 
priority over the application of the extradition treaty.96 As article 30 indicates, however, 
traditional treaty law manages this matter by way of temporality: "it is to be presumed that 
a later treaty prevails over an earlier treaty concerning the same subject-matter",97 due to 
this being the latest expression of intent between the parties.98 Where a human rights 
treaty is predated by arrangements concluded early in the century or before,99 then the 
assumption of human rights primacy would be safe. However, virtually all MLA 
arrangements are later in time than the major human rights regimes and would, according 
to article 30, take precedence over human rights treaties as the latest expression of the will 
of the parties. It seems an unlikely reading of intent on behalf of States that have concluded 
MLATs that "human rights norms will govern our conduct - except during international 
criminal co-operation". 
Moreover, in a Soering-type situation where the requesting State is not a party to the 
relevant human rights instrument, the criminal co-operation treaty governs and the 
requested State may breach its co-operative obligation by fulfilling its human rights duty. 
The fact that a State decides or is instructed by a court to be bound by its human rights 
obligation is no defence to its responsibility to the treaty partner.100 
Other aspects of the law of treaties provide scant comfort for the abrasion caused by treaty 
conflicts.101 One argument is that such human rights as are considered to be jus cogens 
principles will take priority over extradition treaties102 through the operation of articles 
53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention.103 Thus it could be asserted convincingly that 
freedom from slavery is a "trumping" principle, as is freedom from torture, particularly in 
light of the Torture Convention's explicit limitation of extradition.104 The controversy 
which rages over the remaining body of human rights, however, precludes for it any 
realistic qualification as jus cogens.105 
It is by no means clear, for the most part, that human rights norms must take precedence 
over international criminal co-operation treaties.106 As a matter of law, it is difficult to 
justify the proposition that a requesting State bound neither by the human rights treaty nor 
by the jurisdiction of the adjudicative body, such as the United States in Soering, must 
simply relinquish its treaty rights without protest. A court, whether domestic or 
international, can decide this question with regard to the domestic legal effect within the 
requested State, but this will not extinguish the State's responsibility pursuant to its treaty 
obligations.107 
It might be argued that the solution to this dilemma is to acknowledge the conflict between 
transnational criminal process and human rights norms as a limitation of international law, 
and allow such conflicts to be governed politically. From the criminal co-operation point of 
view, however, policy action is required because the existing situation creates political and 
legal conflict between States. Ultimately, many States may be left in breach of their treaty 
obligations or their human rights policies, creating political tensions and undermining the 
general anti-crime regime. The notion of a continuing series of cases like Soering, where 
States are left to negotiate some kind of ad hoc conditional co-operation in an attempt to 
pick up the pieces of a breach of obligation, must give us pause. So, too, must the notion of 
prosecutorial authorities resorting to "unofficial" methods of evidence collection, based on 
perceived human rights "obstacles" to effective criminal co-operation. Moreover, from a 
human rights point of view, States should suffer neither formal nor unofficial sanction for 
upholding their human rights commitments, attacks upon which strike at the very 
foundation of civil order that the criminal law, ironically enough, is designed to protect. 
A scheme for resolving this conflict is necessary, as well, for the continued development of 
MLA schemes. With less concern for the actual bodily integrity of the accused, a looser 
approach to safeguarding rights has been adopted with regard to the kinds of evidence-
taking, proceeds-seizing activities inherent in MLA arrangements. As explored above, 
human rights considerations have, in practice, been applied differently in this context 
despite their common origins in extradition law. However, if the previous submissions are 
correct, then the same morass of conflicting obligations is likely to haunt MLA practice as 
well. For all of these reasons, the balance between protection of the individual and the 
suppression of crime requires a coherent set of international norms to serve as its 
underpinning. It is desirable that this be accomplished by way of internationally negotiated 
treaty provisions and in a manner that removes the potential for conflict, given that treaty 
law in its orthodox form provides no adequate solutions. 
VI. Human Rights and the Requested State: An International Rule of Refusal? 
As has been shown, refusal to provide mutual legal assistance based on concern for the 
protection of the individual is a well-founded aspect of State practice, though such refusal 
has generally been framed in discretionary terms. This discretion reflects a desire on the 
part of authorities to maintain a free flow of evidence between jurisdictions, the implicit 
notion being that the courts of the requesting State are the bodies with the jurisdiction to 
adjudicate with regard to human rights concerns. This in turn is based on the fact that the 
freedom of the accused is not at issue in the requested State, and that it is possible to argue 
that no human rights duty is owed towards this person with regard to MLA. 
However, this perspective limits human rights obligations of the requested State to 
protecting the corporeal person within its jurisdiction, when the very nature of human 
rights norms suggest that the individual's legal interests are the proper focus. If a State is 
willing to refuse cooperation because of potential discrimination in a criminal proceeding, 
then such willingness must be based implicitly on an acknowledgement that being 
complicit in discrimination is contrary to international law duties. It seems only fitting that, 
a priori, the same should apply to even more compelling prohibitions such as torture. 
The discretion, however, remains, especially given that only a limited role for the requested 
State's courts is contemplated by MLA practice. As such, a reasonable aspiration at this 
point in the development of the law of international criminal co-operation is that requested 
States adopt a human rights-oriented policy, but one with legal effect vis-a-vis relations 
with treaty partners. The International Law Association has proposed the insertion of the 
following clause into MLA agreements: 
Assistance shall be refused if it appears to the requested State that there are substantial 
grounds for believing that the rendering of such assistance would result in a serious 
violation of the human rights of any person under any treaty for the protection of human 
rights to which the requested State is a party, under customary international law, or under 
the domestic law of the requested State.108 
This clause utilizes mandatory terminology, reflecting the increasing importance of human 
rights concerns in this context, and allows the requested State to frame its refusal on the 
basis of its own human rights obligations. It also allows States to exert political pressure on 
treaty partners to bring their human rights practices into line with fundamental standards. 
The requirement of "substantial grounds" for suspicion that a "serious" violation "would" 
happen seems to imply an application of quasi-judicial decision-making. However, MLA 
central authorities are arguably capable of determining such a standard, and it allows 
sufficient flexibility for the differences between, for example, common law and civil law 
jurisdictions to be managed reasonably well.109 Such a determination will be fairly easily 
made with regard to customary prohibitions such as torture, arbitrary death, slavery, and 
other more "serious" violations.110 
C. THE REQUESTING STATE: DETERMINING ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
Human rights obligations are no less relevant for the requesting State's MLA practice, in 
that it is this State wherein the accused is likely to face trial. The requesting State is thereby 
subject to the tension between crime control and the protection of the individual in a very 
practical manner it must determine the extent to which evidence provided can be utilized 
in criminal proceedings. However, this tension manifests itself, not in a conflict between 
human rights and MLA obligations, but rather between the State's human rights obligations 
and its crime control objectives. It may be that a requesting State wishing to uphold its 
human rights obligations must give some consideration to the manner in which MLA-based 
evidence has been collected. 
Even this is controversial.111 From an inter-State perspective, authorities will take care to 
avoid any action or policy prescription that smacks of questioning another State's exercise 
of criminal jurisdiction. For the courts of one State to pronounce upon the evidence-
gathering technique of another, through the lens of the requesting State's individual rights 
statute or rules of admissibility, is tantamount to extraterritorial application of the 
requesting State's law. Moreover, if both requesting and requested State are parties to the 
human rights treaty in question, then a finding by the former's court that evidence 
provided by the latter has transgressed a human rights standard may be a de facto 
declaration of breach by the requested State not a move designed to foster good treaty 
relations. On the other hand, if the requested State is not a party to the international human 
rights regime in question, such a decision could again give the impression of 
extraterritorial effect.112 
These issues are less complex with regard to elements of human rights law that have 
entered the customary realm, and that embody jus cogens principles. For example, the 
Torture Convention contains a prohibition of admitting into proceedings any evidence 
obtained by torture,113 and this prohibition's status as customary law means that all 
States are bound by this standard.114 This is by no means a minor statement on the 
balance of human rights with crime control. As the International Law Association has 
stated, "[a] contrary view would amount to accepting that the end (crime suppression . . . ) 
justifies the means (torture), which would run counter to the letter and spirit of 
international human rights instruments".115 A similar case can be made for the other jus 
cogens rights mentioned above. However, this is, as has been shown, a segment of a longer 
list of rights that are potentially relevant to the MLA context. 
I. "Equality of Arms": MLA and the Accused 
As explained above, MLA practice has typically exhibited less concern for the protection of 
the rights of the individual than extradition. This difference takes on a marked importance 
for the accused in the requesting State due to the fact that, unlike the extradition process 
where the judiciary will be involved in applying relevant individual rights protections, no 
such recourse exists underMLA procedure. As extradition involves the potential of actual 
physical transportation of an individual to face criminal proceedings abroad, it is the 
individual who is the subject of the determinative legal proceedings in the requested State, 
i.e., the extradition hearing. Therein, he or she is entitled (though the extent of entitlement 
varies from State to State) to raise both procedural and substantive matters in this 
regard.116 In MLA practice, by contrast, insofar as the taking of evidence will be carried 
out by foreign authorities working within their own jurisdictions, the individual is excluded 
from invoking domestic protection regimes.117 Faced with irregularities or illegalities in 
the requested State, the only recourse for the accused is to the domestic criminal court 
which is presented with the evidence. 
Given MLA's relative youth in comparison to extradition, this can be safely characterized as 
a deliberate expression of policy on the part of co-operating States. An MLA treaty regime is 
an agreement between two States, specifically designed to facilitate co-operation at the 
intergovernmental level. The individual, as such, is the object of the treaty regime, and the 
subject only of criminal proceedings that utilize the evidence so collected; unless the treaty 
expressly awards rights to individuals within its terms, they have none. American practice 
in this area has in fact been to expressly exclude any standing for the individual under 
MLATs.118 
This state of affairs interacts somewhat uneasily with the notion of universal human rights. 
MLA, despite being one of the more modern arrows in the quiver of criminal authorities, 
rests on a traditional international legal framework which, while facilitating action taken 
by the State against the individual, disallows any redress on the international level for 
transgressions against individual liberty. In effect, the pendulum is swung heavily towards 
the interests of the State in the investigation of crime. It can be convincingly argued that 
this is a necessary reality of efforts to combat transnational crime, and that the entire point 
of MLA is to ease procedural difficulties, not create them. Moreover, the individual can 
access such rights in the form of domestic exclusionary rules. Aside from the problem of 
how such "exclusions" take place in practice, to be discussed below, this design allows only 
for ex post facto validation of the individual's rights. International human rights norms are 
designed to protect a vital sphere of the individual's core liberties, and to limit intrusions 
into other liberties to the extent necessary to maintain social order demonstrating a need 
for ex ante protection. The current writer does not submit that the entire MLA process 
should be subject to procedural safeguards at the expense of efficiency of international 
criminal co-operation, nor that it be exposed to judicial scrutiny at every step. However, it 
is desirable that an avenue for human rights protection be committed to by requesting 
States in the context of MLATs. 
The International Law Association has also noted another area of defence weakness in MLA 
practice: "Many [MLATs] seriously violate human rights norms by extending the benefits of 
assistance to the prosecution only. Such a practice violates the principle of 'equality of 
arms' which is a fundamental feature of a fair trial."119 While it seems questionable 
whether a fundamental human rights norm is being violated,120 it is true that under 
typical MLA arrangements the authorities have complete discretion as to which evidence is 
to be gathered under the foreign system. The defence is thus barred from access to an 
inter-State channel for evidence collection and left to its own devices and resources to 
pursue evidence in the foreign jurisdiction. This will often preclude any evidence-gathering 
in the requested State by the defence, even though material which is potentially 
exculpatory may exist beyond the specific parameters of the investigation being 
undertaken by the requesting State authorities. Thus, it is not unrealistic to contemplate an 
unfair trial as a result of evidence beneficial to the defence being unretrievable, perhaps 
even unknown to the defence, on this basis. 
There have been proposals at various levels to address these concerns. The International 
Law Association has proposed that States consider "the needs of the indigent individual 
unable to afford to collect evidence in his defence abroad",121 although even wealthy 
defendants would need access to mostly inaccessible governmental machinery in the 
foreign jurisdiction. The government of Australia has addressed this concern more fully in 
an amendment to its MLA implementing legislation that "formalizes the role of the 
Attorney-General in seeking foreign evidence at the request of the defence".122 The 
Commonwealth Law Ministers have recently adopted a recommendation stating that "court 
based [MLA] channels should be available equally to the defence and prosecution and that 
every country accepted that requests for assistance made by courts on the motion of the 
defence should, in the interests of justice, be responded to".123 While the collective 
frustration of prosecutors would be palpable if such a policy were instituted world-wide, it 
does offer a means of protecting the fairness of criminal proceedings, and perhaps provides 
a means of balancing the State's exclusive control over evidence-gathering. 
II. MLA and Non-Inquiry 
The distinctive delicacy of the criminal jurisdiction is reflected in current MLA practice. 
MLATs, in keeping with the traditional letters rogatory system, are not designed to be 
substantive law-making instruments in terms of their domestic applicability. Rather, they 
are designed to provide a functional co-ordination of the domestic criminal law regimes, so 
that evidence may be transmitted from one to another. Domestic statutes, in such 
jurisdictions that have them, are generally designed to provide a "fit" between the 
international obligation and the domestic criminal procedure. The goal, as such, is not to 
change either State's criminal process, but to establish a system by which they can interact. 
This is reflected in the widely-employed treaty provision, which also appears in the United 
Nations Model Treaty, to the effect that requests with regard to taking of evidence, search 
and seizure, etc. are to be carried out in accordance with the law of the requested State.124 
When a treaty relationship has been entered into, the States concerned have a vested 
interest in maintaining a working relationship that reflects a sense of obligation. As such, 
the courts of the requesting State will not scrutinize the collection of evidence by the 
authorities of the treaty partner State to the same extent as would be done domestically. 
There may be an analogy to the extradition context in this respect. The Canadian case of 
Argentina v. Mellino125 noted that, where a treaty exists, an assumption that the 
authorities of the treaty partner will not sufficiently consider the interests of fairness and 
human rights "is offensive to notions of comity and 'amounts to a serious adverse reflection 
. . . on foreign governments to whomCanada has a treaty obligation . . . '"126 It is tempting 
to deduce from this expression of policy that the executive arm of a government is likely to 
conclude treaties only with States which are like-minded in terms of protecting the 
individual during criminal process. Such a deduction would pale, however, in light of the 
fact that the goal of MLA instruments is access to evidence in other jurisdictions, the 
"unlocking" of one State's law on behalf of another.127 The prime criterion for the 
formation of arrangements with other States is the number of requests that are expected to 
be made, rather than congruence of human rights policy. The MLA system is designed for 
speed and flexibility in the fight against international crime, and this is likely to dominate 
over any notions of political concurrence.128 Thus, for the courts of the requesting State to 
base a refusal to examine the human rights standard of evidence collection in the requested 
State on an assumption of good will seems disingenuous at best. A more accurate 
interpretation of the application of comity in this regard is simply that it does not make for 
good relations to allow even the appearance of questioning the criminal process of a treaty 
partner State. Given the importance of reciprocity in theMLA relationship, States are also 
likely to be unenthusiastic about any questioning of their own criminal process in a 
requesting State, a further motivator in keeping judicial exclusions of evidence to a 
minimum. 
The case law of several States active in MLA indicates that courts will generally not inquire 
into the propriety of the taking of evidence, including searches and seizures, that occurs in 
requested jurisdictions. This approach is consistent with the "rule of non-inquiry" in 
extradition matters.129 The prime justification applied by courts is an unwillingness to 
adjudicate either the laws of other States or the actions taken by their law enforcement 
authorities, due to sovereignty concerns, the interests of comity, and perhaps most 
centrally lack of jurisdiction. The effect from a human rights standpoint, however, is the 
same in that the accused can be deprived of the protection of admissibility standards of 
both the requesting and requested States. This also raises the potential of admitting 
evidence taken by methods that contravene the provisions of international human rights 
treaties to which the requesting State is a party, and that this in turn will violate the 
requesting State's human rights obligations. Despite this having been raised as a possibility 
by European Commission on Human Rights dicta,130 there appears to be no sense of 
opinio juris among States that admission of such evidence would incur a violation of human 
rights instruments. Courts, when faced with the question, have generally fallen back on a 
general approach, if not a "rule", of non-inquiry. 
Cases have dealt with two instances: where the evidence-gathering was performed in 
accordance with the laws of the requested State, but would be inadmissible under the 
requesting State's rules of evidence; and where the evidence-gathering was illegal under 
the laws of the requested State. The approach of the courts, however, has been broadly the 
same in both to refuse to scrutinize the conduct of foreign authorities acting in their own 
jurisdictions. Evidence taken abroad will generally be admitted unless the Court regards it 
as "shocking," or if admitting it would threaten the fairness of the trial. A classic example is 
the series of Belgian "telephone-tapping" cases reviewed by Gane and Mackarel.131 In each 
of these, telephone interception evidence, which was inadmissible under Belgian law at the 
time, was nonetheless allowed into criminal proceedings by the Cour de Cassation. In one 
the interception was carried out in the Netherlands under a request from the Belgian 
authorities,132 while in another the Belgian authorities had requested access to pre-
existing interceptions in France.133 In all cases, the Court ruled that, although such 
evidence would have been inadmissible had it been obtained in Belgium, the fact that the 
interceptions were consistent with requested States' laws which had been upheld as valid 
by the European Court of Human Rights extinguished any objections to reliance upon them. 
The Canadian courts have taken a more expansive view of non-inquiry. In two non-MLAT 
cases, R. v. Harrer134 and R. v. Terry,135 the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed136 that 
evidence taken by American officials which met American procedural requirements but did 
not meet the standards of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms would be 
admissible nonetheless, as the Charter was only intended to regulate the behaviour of 
Canadian police and could not apply extraterritorially.137 In both cases the Court stated 
that exclusion of evidence would be possible if the manner in which the evidence was taken 
rendered the trial unfair, or if admitting it would "bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute", and noted that this was geared towards achieving "a just accommodation 
between the interests of the individual and those of the State in providing a fair and 
workable system of justice".138 
An interesting recent Canadian case regarding MLA is Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney 
General).139 Schreiber is a complex case, and has been variously mischaracterized as 
having to do with "collecting evidence by invading the suspect's privacy",140 and "the 
classic example" of "case law upon the propriety of obtaining evidence from a foreign 
jurisdiction by means that would not be available in one's own jurisdiction".141 The case 
was in fact not about admissibility, but rather whether the right to privacy, embodied in 
section 8 of the Canadian Charter, was engaged by the sending of a letter of request for 
MLA. Canadian authorities had made a letters rogatory request of Switzerland for seizure 
of Schreiber's bank records. Search and seizure under the Charter in Canada requires 
judicial pre-authorization in the form of a warrant, but MLA practice required none. In 
response to Schreiber's argument that the request engaged his section 8 right to privacy, 
the Court found that the letter of request itself did not endanger the privacy right. Any 
search and seizure affecting Schreiber's privacy would take place within Swiss jurisdiction, 
and thus was not within the ambit of the Charter. 
As such, the case did not specifically address the exclusion of evidence that invaded the 
privacy right, but the Court did make some comment on this topic. Chief Justice Lamer 
stated that, having chosen to bank in Switzerland, Schreiber was entitled only to whatever 
privacy protection regime operated under Swiss law.142 He also noted the Court's 
reluctance to measure foreign laws against Canadian constitutional guarantees, but 
declared that evidence could be excluded if it "affected the fairness of a trial held in 
Canada".143 Though the parties had led no evidence regarding Swiss law, the Chief Justice 
seemed to intimate that a search in violation of Swiss law might have been relevant to a 
determination of fairness.144 
British and American case law and practice have demonstrated an even looser standard. In 
the United States "the courts have consistently reaffirmed the principle that the actions of 
foreign law enforcement officials, and evidence obtained outside the United States by those 
actions, are not subject to the usual constitutional protections afforded by the Bill of 
Rights".145 As such, in Brulay v. United States,146 questioning, searches and seizures by 
Mexican officials, which contravened the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the 
Constitution but did not violate Mexican law, were ruled admissible. The United States 
Constitution did not apply to foreign law enforcement officers. A series of cases following 
Brulay confirmed this rule, though adding the caveat "that the actions of foreign officials 
should not be such as to 'shock the conscience' of the Court".147 United States courts have 
maintained this perspective even towards evidence gathered illegally by their own agents 
outside the jurisdiction, transmitted by means which ignored an existing MLA 
arrangement.148 
In the United Kingdom, the legislature has moved to submit evidence gathered under MLA 
requests to domestic admissibility rules.149 Even under these rules, however, the 
discretion awarded to judges has resulted in findings similar to those of United States 
courts, extending non-inquiry even to a case where wiretap evidence admitted in an 
English court was taken in France in breach of both French law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights by American agents.150 The recent Scottish case of Torres v. 
H.M. Advocate151 summarized the position of the Scots criminal jurisdiction prior to the 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into the domestic law: the 
courts have a "well-understood discretion to exclude evidence which has been obtained by 
means which . . . are 'offensive to our fundamental principles of justice and fair play' ".152 
III. An International Exclusionary Rule? 
The foregoing survey of case law illustrates the traditional response of States to evidence 
which may in its taking violate international human rights norms. This response is 
primarily based on the wide-ranging discretion possessed by the courts to admit or exclude 
such evidence from criminal proceedings. There is an apparent consensus among the 
various courts that the general policy of non-inquiry will be tempered by exclusion in the 
interests of "fairness", "fundamental principles of justice", where the conduct "shocks the 
conscience of the court", or whether admission would "bring the administration of justice 
into disrepute". 
From an international obligation point of view, this remains an extremely grey area. The 
language of "justice" and "fairness" employed by the courts is not specifically tailored to 
implementing human rights norms to which a State is party, with the possible exception of 
general fair trial rights. The courts have been disinclined to hold that, for example, grievous 
violations of the right to privacy which breach the accused's rights both under 
international law and domestic law will be excluded, preferring to rely on the general, 
discretionary approach. Obviously, as demonstrated by the Belgian cases, not all practices 
which would violate the requesting State's laws represent human rights violations; but 
quaere which ones will? The nexus between the laws of the requesting State and its 
international human rights obligations is left unaddressed. Also unanswered is the central 
question: is the requesting State under an obligation to exclude evidence that is the product 
of conduct that violates its human rights obligations? State practice, as embodied in the 
judgements of criminal courts, would seem to posit such an international exclusionary rule, 
but only in the most heinous or "shocking" of cases. Based on the dicta of the courts, it is 
likely that evidence-gathering which involved, for example, cruel and unusual treatment 
falling short of torture would be excluded as being contrary to the interests of fairness. On 
the whole, however, courts have proven difficult to "shock",153 and have declined to 
exclude evidence resulting from serious invasions of privacy and personal liberty. They are, 
moreover, generally reluctant to interfere with the processes of international criminal co-
operation, which are seen to rest on vital interests of international comity and thus remain 
the preserve of the executive. 
The problem appears to be articulating an international human rights standard at the 
domestic level, one which the courts can apply when determining admissibility. 
Admittedly, each State will have its own interpretation (and possibly domestic 
implementation) of the human rights norm in question, and these will obviously not accord 
uniformly on the international level. It seems logical, however, that requesting State parties 
to international human rights treaties are obliged to give effect to the enumerated rights 
vis-a-vis accused persons within their jurisdictions. For the human rights obligation to be 
made effective, in turn, the courts must have recourse to a standard that reflects the 
obligation itself in a specific manner, rather than simply how a transgression affects the 
fairness of proceedings. 
Various formulations have been proffered for a rule of exclusion where the evidence "has 
been obtained in violation of international human rights standards" binding upon the 
requesting State.154 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia provide that "[e]vidence obtained directly or indirectly by means 
which constitute a serious violation of internationally protected human rights shall not be 
admissible".155 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court includes the 
following: 
Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or internationally recognized 
human rights shall not be admissible if: 
a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or 
b) The admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the 
integrity of the proceedings.156 
The Rome Statute appears to enact an approach similar to that already taken by courts in 
determining admissibility. However, it first leaves the question open of which rights will be 
considered "internationally recognized". Does this refer to principles which have attained 
jus cogens status or entered customary law? Or to rights which are common to major 
human rights instruments? Then, having found a human rights violation, the Court will not 
automatically exclude but determine if the manner of taking "casts doubt" on its reliability, 
or would be antithetical to and damage the integrity of proceedings. This leaves the Court a 
great deal of discretion in refusing to exclude evidence, depending on how its future 
jurisprudence determines the parameters of the "integrity of proceedings". It is arguable 
that this level of flexibility and discretion is appropriate for this particular court, as the 
seriousness of the matters with which it is concerned may merit a more flexible approach 
towards evidence collection. To provide such a standard at the inter-State level, however, 
would seem overly broad and open to abuse. 
The International Law Association's latest submissions attempt to set a standard more 
appropriate to the domestic court setting. In its Third Report, the ILA proposed that a 
treaty provision be included in MLA arrangements declaring "a requested State shall not 
violate international human rights norms in its collection of evidence. Evidence obtained in 
violation of such norms shall not be admissible in proceedings in the requesting State."157 
It also "encouraged" States to develop domestic admissibility laws along the lines of the 
Yugoslavia Tribunal's Rule 95, noting sensibly that, "it is unlikely that municipal courts will 
apply a customary rule without the endorsement of municipal law".158 The formulation of 
the domestic rule did not appear in the Third Report's final recommendations, however. 
Moreover, in its Final Report even these suggestions were critically softened. The Final 
Resolutions adopted by the Conference bade States to include the following clause in their 
mutual legal assistance agreements: 
1. A requested State shall, in the rendering of assistance, observe the norms of human 
rights contained in any treaty for the protection of human rights to which it is a party, 
under customary international law, or under the domestic law of the requested State. 
2. Where assistance has been rendered by the requested State contrary to paragraph 1 of 
this clause, the authorities of the requesting State shall consider to what extent, if at all, 
such assistance should be admissible in proceedings in the requesting State.159 
While this proposal makes international human rights norms nominally more relevant to 
MLA practice and court proceedings, it defers to domestic admissibility standards in a 
manner similar to current court practice. "Considering" the extent of admissibility in the 
face of human rights violations does nothing to give effect to the rights themselves under 
the requesting State's criminal regime. Moreover, while the ILA makes several 
recommendations for the amendment of domestic extradition laws to make similar 
proposals effective, the MLA recommendations are not accompanied by any such proposed 
amendments. This is particularly noteworthy in two respects. First, the courts of many 
States would require legislative authority to exclude evidence specifically on the basis of 
human rights violations. Second, and perhaps most important, no provision is made for the 
individual to be able to invoke such protections. Without these two additional steps, any 
recourse offered by such an "exclusion clause" in an MLA treaty would not provide real, 
substantive protection of the rights of the individual. 
As such, and drawing upon the various proposals examined above, the following 
submissions are offered: 
1. States should include inMLATs a clause to the following effect: (a) the requested State 
shall, in the rendering of assistance, observe the norms contained in any human rights 
treaty to which it is a party, under customary international law, or under the domestic law 
of the requested State; (b) evidence obtained through serious violations of international 
human rights norms shall not be admissible in the requesting State. 
2. States should amend their domestic MLA statutes or other relevant laws to ensure: (a) 
that courts in criminal proceedings are required to exclude evidence which is the product 
of serious violations of human rights norms contained in any human rights treaty to which 
it is a party, under customary international law, or under the domestic law of the requested 
State; (b) that individuals are entitled to assert these rights. 
This approach offers the advantage of focusing on specific human rights obligations rather 
than "fairness of proceedings". It provides a basically intelligible standard for courts 
evaluating admissibility, and gives direct effect to the actual human rights norms which 
bind the requesting State, whether customary or treaty-based. The inclusion of 
"seriousness" as a criterion in determining admissibility would allow the courts a standard 
of flexibility desirable from an enforcement point of view.160 Moreover, the negotiation of 
treaty provisions would place continuing "upward" pressure on MLA treaty partners to act 
in accordance with international human rights standards. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The proposals offered above are necessarily no more than suggestions for methods by 
which international criminal co-operation and human rights concerns can be balanced in a 
manner reflecting both coherence and delineated international legal obligation. That they 
will be controversial is taken as given; while there has been traditional agreement that the 
protection of the individual's physical being justifies exceptions to extradition obligations, 
the protection of personal legal interests attracts far less consensus. States may view this as 
an unwarranted intrusion into the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, while prosecutors and 
central authorities may perceive it as an ill-conceived handicap to the important mission of 
facilitating the fight against transnational crime. However, it should be reiterated that it 
remains possible to exclude the most serious of violations without hopelessly encumbering 
the system of co-operation, provided the system is amended with care and vision. 
Moreover, the significance of international human rights protection is that it enumerates 
certain fundamental, universal values. There are some roads down which we must not go, 
lest we inadvertently offer the most pernicious of criminals the victories they seek. 
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